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      【12月4日】 【CEMA研討會2019秋季第十三講】 Confusion and Competition

      發布日期:2019-11-28  點擊數:

      論文題目:Confusion and Competition

      報告人:劉爍(北京大學光華管理學院應用經濟系助理教授)

      論文摘要:Do firms seek to make a market transparent or do they want to manipulate the perception of product characteristics? Contrary to the well-studied case of homogeneous goods, obfuscation is not necessarily an equilibrium phenomenon in markets with differentiated goods. In particular, if the taste distribution is polarized, so that indifferent consumers are relatively rare, firms seek to educate consumers. However, if the taste distribution features a concentration of indecisive consumers, confusion is beneficial for firms and obfuscation an equilibrium strategy. The adverse welfare consequences of obfuscation can be more severe than with homogeneous goods, as consumers may not only pay higher prices, but also choose a dominated option or deny choice altogether. Our model can also be adapted to offer new insights on the incentives for political candidates to induce polarized opinions by confusing voters.

      時間:12月4日(周三)中午12:10-13:30

      地點:學院南路校區學術會堂712

      報告人簡介:劉爍,2019年畢業于瑞士蘇黎世大學經濟系,獲博士學位,現為北京大學光華管理學院應用經濟系助理教授。目前主要研究領域為組織經濟學,產業組織理論,機制設計和博弈論。研究成果發表或即將發表于Theoretical Economics, RAND Journal of Economics, Games and Economic Behavior, Economic Theory等國際知名學術期刊。

      主辦:中國經濟與管理研究院

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